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Abstract: The article presents Polish and Hungarian main left -wing parties in the period of 
political transformation. There are a few sections in the article that develop the research prob‑
lem: the genesis and development of the parties from 1989 to 2014, a comparative analysis of 
the two parties based on quantitative indices. 
One can say there are some similarities between SLD and MSzP. The parties were trans‑
formed from communist hegemon formations, then participated in free parliamentary elections 
with some successes, created several governments and both have recently faced considerable 
loss of support. SLD and MSzP belong to the parties that influenced Polish and Hungarian 
transformation greatly. 
Key words: political parties, Poland, Hungary, SLD, MSzP 
Introduction
Some years have gone since central -right parties started to rule and domi‑
nate the state politics in Poland and Hungary. In Poland in 2005 Law and 
Justice (Pol. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) won the parliamentary elections, 
and then Civic Platform (Pol. Platforma Obywatelska, PO) achieved electoral 
victory twice. In Hungary Fidesz won in 2010 and 2014. It would be interest‑
ing to define past and contemporary position of the left side of both political 
scenes as the one which makes the opposition now. It seems that Poles and 
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Hungarians have recently preferred more traditional and conservative values 
and do not support social -democratic appeal. To understand this phenomenon 
I decided to choose to follow the development of the most relevant left -wing 
parties in Poland and Hungary and search for the reason why the left is not 
dominant any more. 
The main aim of the article is to show the role and significance of one of 
important sides of party system in two chosen countries of Central Europe. 
I am going to present the relevant and dominant parties of the left that took 
important position throughout the period of political transformation in Poland 
and Hungary. Contemporary position of Polish and Hungarian leftist parties 
does not reflect their significance as it used to in the past. A few recent years 
were harsh for these organisations and they lost their privileged role in the 
political and party systems. Although we can observe that in post -modern 
world the traditional division in politics into the left and the right diminished, 
it is still possible to point to leftist and rightist values in the programmes of 
political parties. That is why we can say that the left - and right -wing organi‑
sations can search for support of electorate and then influence state policy. 
The thesis of the article is that despite social, historical and other differ‑
ences of Polish and Hungarian left -wing parties, there are some similarities 
as well. To verify the thesis I put forward some research questions: 1) How 
did the dominant social -democratic parties emerge and enter to contempo‑
rary party system? 2) What made them successful during parliamentary elec‑
tions? 3) Why they have been recently less popular and is it a constant trend? 
My analysis begins in 1989, the year when political transition started. 
Next, I shall try to search for crucial moments for Polish and Hungarian left, 
times of successes and failures. Finally, I am going to focus on contemporary 
position of the parties. My analysis concerns parties which received parlia‑
mentary mandates and were relevant over 25 years of political transforma‑
tion. The two main examples of the parties are Democratic Left Alliance (Pol. 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and Hungarian Socialist Party (Hun. 
Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSzP). I decided to divide the article into three 
sections, comprising respectively: 1) the parties’ genesis, 2) profiles of the 
parties and important points in the process of development, 3) a comparison 
of the strength and position of Polish and Hungarian left -wing parties. 
The justification of choosing SLD and MSzP refers to a theoretical con‑
cepts that place the two parties in the same group of Central European 
political organisations. They belong to the same family of parties which is 
obvious. Such scholars as Paul G. Lewis, Herbert Kitschelt and Katarzyna 
Sobolewska -Myślik call this family social -democratic.1 They are even in 
1 P.G. Lewis: Political Parties in Post ‑Communist Eastern Europe. Routledge 2002, p. 
56; H. K it schelt: Party Systems in East Central Europe. Consolidation or Fluidity? Glas‑
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the same social -democratic family, as described by Andrzej Antoszewski 
and Jerzy J. Wiatr.2 Both Polish and Hungarian left -wing dominant parties 
are similar in many ways which is more obvious if we compare them to 
Czech and Slovak leftist parties. To make a contemporary comparison of the 
strengths and influences of SLD and MSzP, I will present quantitative analy‑
sis based on three indices. 
The genesis 
Poland and Hungary started to reshape their political systems 25 years 
ago. In 1980s communist ruling elites were unable to cope with worsening 
conditions in the society, economics and political spheres due to internal and 
external factors. There was a totally different situation on political scene at 
that time. Both communist Poland and Hungary had a solid and hegemonic 
communist parties: Polish United Workers’ Party (Pol. Polska Zjednoczona 
Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) and Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Hun. 
Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSzMP). In Poland there were also two 
other parties that were allowed to exist during communist era: United Peo‑
ple’s Party (Pol. Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL) and Alliance of 
Democrats (Pol. Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD). In Hungary there was 
only MSzMP. So, Polish and Hungarian communist systems followed two 
different paths. It is necessary to make an assumption that there were no free 
party systems in communism and other parties than communist like ZSL or 
SD played a role of submissive and weak satellites.3 Apart from Poland, Bul‑
garia, Czechoslovakia and East Germany also had quasi -multi -party systems, 
while USSR and Romania had hegemonic party systems. 
Analysing the ancestors of contemporary leading leftist parties in Poland 
and Hungary one could make a comparison of a few important data and 
situations that happened in the two countries under communism regime. 
They can reflect some factors of position and social perception of the par‑
ties throughout genetic period of transformation in Poland and Hungary after 
1989 and 1990. 
gow 1995, Working Paper, No. 241; K. Sobolewska  -Myśl i k: Partie i systemy partyjne 
Europy Środkowej po 1989 roku. Kraków 1999, p. 159.
2 A. A ntoszewsk i: Partie polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Poznań 2005, 
pp. 51—63; J.J. Wiat r: Europa pokomunistyczna. Przemiany państw i społeczeństw po 1989 
roku. Warszawa 2006, pp. 166—171.
3 J. Wojn ick i: Kształtowanie się systemów wielopartyjnych Europy Środkowowschod‑
niej. Pułtusk 2004, pp. 38—40.
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First of all, in both countries communist parties gained power through 
illegal and anti -democratic means. Before the Second World War communist 
organisations were banned and during the war they acted in the underground. 
They could not count on big social support, partly because Polish and Hungar‑
ian societies were traditional, conservative, religious with majority of agricul‑
tural class. So, after the end of the war the communist parties were unable to 
seize power on the way of legal democratic elections. They benefited from 
Joseph Stalin’s supervision. Because of narrow social support for communist 
ideas, communist parties used the socialist ones as political allies and a vehi‑
cle to make Poles and Hungarians vote for them, because socialists were more 
popular. The first parliamentary elections reflected the weak electoral support 
for communists. During the 4 November 1945 elections the Hungarian Com‑
munist Party (Hun. Magyar Kommunista Párt, MKP) was third with 17.0% 
of votes. Yet, before the elections communists anticipated that they could 
receive even 70.0%.4 The second elections in post -war Hungary were held on 
31 August 1947. Although MKP won, its advantage over the opponents was 
small. MKP received 22.3% of total votes while second Christian Democratic 
People’s Party (Hun. Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) obtained 16.5% 
and third Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (Hun. 
Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt, FKFPP) got 15.3%.5 First 
Polish post -war elections were held on 19 January 1947. The official results 
for Democratic Bloc, which included communist Polish Workers’ Party (Pol. 
Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR), was 80.1% of total votes, but these results are 
questioned and they are believed to stem from an electoral fraud. Historians 
state that the most popular party was Polish People’s Party (Pol. Polskie Stron‑
nictwo Ludowe, PSL). The same phenomenon occurred in Hungary where 
peasant’s party also dominated at the time. Popularity of PSL and FKFPP 
reflected the dominance of traditional values in mostly agricultural societies. 
These data show that without external and illegal actions the communist par‑
ties would not have been unable to garner social support in the post -war period. 
But, in the later period, communist parties became hegemons and their 
structures encompassed entire states. When it was obvious that communist 
regime was solid, people understood that to obtain a better job and social 
position, it was necessary to be a communist party member. Nonetheless, 
there remained groups that were dissatisfied with the new power and insti‑
gated some rebellions. In 1956, a national revolution took place in Hungary, 
and in Poland there were several consecutive social outbursts: 1956, 1968, 
1970, 1976, and 1980, respectively. How did the party manage to survive 
4 C. Gat i: “From Liberation to Revolution (1945—1956).” In: History of Hungary. Eds. 
P. Suga r, P. Hanák, T. Fran k. Indiana 1995, p. 371.
5 A. Cz yż, S. Kubas: Doświadczenia węgierskiej transformacji ustrojowej — od 
Jánosa Kádára do Viktora Orbána. Katowice 2011, p. 21. 
87Sebastian Kubas: Similarities and differences of main left-wing…
after the military troops had pacified rebels? The official method of the com‑
munist party development was the strengthening of the social control. The 
party officials almost always expelled or otherwise eliminated the “uncertain 
members.” As Richard F. Staar claims, after the June 1956, PZPR expelled 
300,000 members and after the 1968 and 1970 rebellions, another 300,000 
members were forced to leave.6 After the 1956 national revolution was paci‑
fied, János Kádár managed to purge the “dangerous elements” of the party 
and in the beginning of 1960s Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Hun. 
Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSzMP) amounted to 500,000 in compari‑
son to about 1 million members at the beginning of the 1950s.7 The hegem‑
onic parties entered the last decade of the communist regime with 2,942,000 
(PZPR) and 811,833 (MSzMP) members respectively.8 There were 35,746,000 
Poles and 10,710,000 Hungarians, which meant that PZPR members made 
8.2% of total population and MSzMP members 7.58%.
Despite the solid social background of communist parties, their struc‑
tures started to tremble. Why did workers, peasants and so -called working 
intelligentsia withdraw their support for the parties that aimed at represent‑
ing them? It was because the communist hegemons turn their backs on the 
people and closed themselves. Human needs were less important than organi‑
sational and structural questions. Overwhelming control over social life led 
to social criticism and questioning of the communists’ power in Poland and 
Hungary. People felt their freedom was limited and started to rebel. 
During the time of the regime decline, Polish and Hungarian elites decid‑
ed to negotiate with opposition. There were two main wings in PZPR and 
MSzMP which opposed each other. One wing, called the reformists, wanted 
to talk to opposition and include some of their members to legislative and 
executive powers, while the orthodox group were closed and did not trust 
the oppositionists. Without the reformists a peaceful and quick transition in 
both countries would not have been possible. MSzMP reformist members 
such as Imre Pozsgay, Miklós Németh, Rezső Nyers, who decided to initi‑
ate the talks with oppositionists and convinced communist party elites to 
the necessity of changes in political system, would still respect the socialist 
guidelines. In PZPR a group of reformists was headed by Wojciech Jaruzel‑
ski and Mieczysław Rakowski. Herbert Kitschelt counted Poland and Hun‑
gary among the national -accommodative communism, which was connected 
with liberalization and reforms undertook by communist elites because of the 
anti ‑communist social mobilization. He uses the term reformists to describe 
communists who became leaders in the 1980s, but were unable to change 
6 R.F. St a a r: Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe. Stanford 1984, p. 158.
7 Report to the Second Congress of the Hungarian Working People’s Party from 25 Febru‑
ary 1951 [http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/archive/rakosi51.htm (accessed 20.8.2014)].
8 R.F. St a a r: Communist Regimes…, p. 342.
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history.9 The actions of reformists lead to the negotiations with the oppo‑
sitionists: Polish Round Table (6 February—5 April 1989) and Hungarian 
Round Table (13 June—18 September 1989).10 After negotiations and before 
the first free elections, which took place in 1990 in Hungary and 1991 in 
Poland, both communist parties changed their profiles. MSzMP dissolved its 
structure on 7 October 1989 and transformed into Hungarian Socialist Party 
(Hun. Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSzP). Some orthodox members decided to 
rebuild Hungarian Communist Worker’s Party on 17 December 1989 (Hun. 
Magyar Munkáspárt, MM). Atilla Ágh thinks that the emergence of MM 
helped MSzP to create a new and modern profile of social -democratic party 
because radical socialist ideology was taken and maintained by MM.11 In 
Poland, in turn, PZPR was dissolved in January 1990 and then transformed 
into Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Pol. Socjaldemokracja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, SdRP). SdRP and MSzP became main successors 
of communist formations. 
They decided to change their profiles into a social -democratic ones. As 
András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama state, Polish and Hungarian communist 
parties became so -called reformed and non -transmuted parties, while in other 
Central and Eastern European countries there were also post -communist 
parties that were non -transmuted and non -reformed, partly transmuted and 
non -reformed, transmuted and non -reformed, partly transmuted and partly 
reformed, transmuted and partly reformed, non -transmuted and reformed. 
The authors say that reformed parties became pragmatic and modern organi‑
sations, while non -reformed were clung to an orthodox -communist identity. 
They explain that transmuted parties decided to break with their typical left‑
ist tradition and background and managed a nationalist turn to gather social 
support.12
Jerzy J. Wiatr analysed the examples of emerging new socialist forces in 
Central and Eastern Europe chronologically and he pointed at Hungary as 
a country where communist reformed themselves before the first free elec‑
tions, while PZPR transformed itself after the elections in 1989. But if we 
9 H. K it schelt: “Constraints and Opportunities in the Strategic Conduct of Post-
Communist Successor Parties. Regime Legacies as Casual Argument.” In: The Communist 
Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Eds. A. Bozók i, J.T. I sh iyama. New 
York 2002, p. 19.
10 R.L. Tökés: Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, Social Change, 
Political Succession. Cambridge 1998.
11 A. Ágh: “The Early Freezing of the East Central European Parties: the Case of 
the Hungarian Socialist Party.” Budapest Papers on Democratic Transition 1995, no. 129, 
pp. 7—8.
12 A. Bozók i, J.T. I sh iyama: “Introduction and Theoretical Framework.” In: The 
Communist Successor Parties…, pp. 6—7.
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agree that first entirely free elections took place in Poland in 1991, then Polish 
and Hungarian post -communist parties would be in the same group.13 Jacek 
Wojnicki divides post -communist parties into reformed ones which he calls 
social -democratic and nostalgic (socialist) ones. Both Hungarian and Polish 
post -communists belong to the first type.14 Andrzej Antoszewski writes about 
leftist parties in Central and Eastern Europe using the criteria of their origin. 
He divides leftist parties into: reformed post -communist parties, reactivated 
social -democracies and new social -democratic parties founded after 1989.15 
SdRP and MSzP are reformed post -communist parties. 
The development process of Polish and Hungarian  
relevant left -wing parties
Of course, the main successors of communist parties were not the only 
political forces trying to present socialist and social -democratic values during 
the transition period. Apart from SdRP, there were new leftist organisations 
in Poland, such as Labour Solidarity (Pol. Solidarność Pracy, SP) or Demo‑
cratic and Social Movement (Pol. Ruch Demokratyczno -Społeczny, RDS). 
Some former PZPR members under leadership of Tadeusz Fiszbach’s created 
the Polish Social -Democratic Union (Pol. Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczna, 
PUS). In Hungary there were communist MM, reshaped MSzP and a histori‑
cal social -democratic party: Hungarian Social -Democratic Party (Hun. Mag‑
yarorszagi Szociáldemokrata Párt, MSzDP), but the first parliamentary elec‑
tions showed that only MSzP and SdRP obtaine drelevance among the left. In 
1991, SdRP created a broad electoral coalition called Democratic Left Alli‑
ance (Pol. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) with parties and organisa‑
tions which did not hide their participation in public life during communism 
like: All -Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (Pol. Ogólnopolskie Porozum‑
ienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ), Alliance of Polish Socialist Youth 
(Pol. Związek Socjalistycznej Młodzieży Polskiej, ZSMP), Women’s Demo‑
cratic Union (Pol. Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet, DUK) and Polish Socialist 
Party (Pol.Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS). 
Mass membership went down in both parties. From about 2 million PZPR 
members SdRP dwindled to just 20,000 members in 1990, and of about 
700,000 MSzMP members MSzP inherited 30,000 at the end of 1989. With 
13 J.J. Wiat r: Europa pokomunistyczna…, pp. 166—171.
14 J. Wojn ick i: Kształtowanie się systemów politycznych…, p. 96.
15 A. A ntoszewsk i: Partie polityczne…, pp. 51—63.
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many changes both post -communist parties reshaped their organizational 
structures. They were hierarchical, homonogeneous, oligarchic and new 
internal institutions were weak with controlled membership. Decentraliza‑
tion was partial. There were fractions inside MSzP and SdRP, but central 
apparatus exerted strong control over party affairs.16 
It occurred that many previous communist party members returned their 
party cards, which resulted from several factors. First of all, the post-com‑
munist party affiliation was no longer needed since it was possible to live and 
fulfil socio -political and economic needs without being a SdRP and an MSzP 
member. Secondly, post -communist party affiliation became even a handicap 
because free society perceived post -communists negatively. Thirdly, many 
former communist party members withdrew their support due to the total 
failure of PZPR and MSzMP in the 1980s. These ruling parties were unable 
to heal worsening economics and it made Poland and Hungary plunged into 
crisis. Fourthly, initially communist party was responsible for representing 
working class. Later, it wanted to represent peasants and working intelli‑
gentsia and finally whole society was under communist party surveillance. 
It meant that post -communist forces had to reshape their political appeal and 
describe the electoral segment they were reaching for. Fifthly, after 1989 
people could express their political preferences and choose their party from 
the list of multiple organisations. This situation naturally made many com‑
munist party members withdraw. Although there was a massive membership 
resignation trend seen during the transformation from communist to post-
 -communist parties, the latter did not fall. 
As Iván Szelényi and János Ladányi suggest, Polish and Hungarian post-
communist parties managed to succeed in 1990s because they accepted new 
social democracy programmes: in economics they balanced between demand 
and supply economics and in politics they decided to clean their attitude 
of etatism. Another factor that strengthened post -communist organisations 
was the weakness of liberal parties.17 Let us shortly look at the political pro‑
grammes of SdRP and MSzP in 1990s. Polish SdRP emphasized the market 
reforms, favoured general privatization policy but with amendments aimed 
at better life conditions for employees. Polish left supported combating the 
negative side effects of transformation, promoted the idea of secular state 
and limited role of the Church. SdRP wanted to review abortion law. In for‑
16 R. Markowsk i: The Polish SLD in the 1990s. From Opposition to Incumbents and 
Back. The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Eds. A. Bozók i, 
J.T. I sh iyama. New York 2002, p. 59; A. Körösény i: Government and Politics in Hun‑
gary. Budapest 1998.
17 I. Szelény i, J. Ladány i: “Prospects and Limits in New Social Democracy in 
the Transitional Societies of Central Europe.” In: The Communist Successor Parties…, 
pp. 43—48.
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eign policy this party was initially a bit reserved to “western opening,” but 
then accepted the plan of European integration.18 Although MSzP decided to 
present itself as a social -democratic party, a lot of effort was put to under‑
line deideologization attitude. That is why MSzP presented pragmatic point 
of view and modernization values.19 In economics MSzP favoured market 
reforms but with support for lower class and it presented a moderate axiologi‑
cal attitude. 
Both parties won second free elections. SLD won in 1993 and MSzP in 
1994. The success of the left resulted from social disappointment with previ‑
ous years of right -wing and centre parties’ dominance. They were new non-
experienced formations that came into being after the fall of communism. 
They governed the countries simultaneously consolidating their structures. 
They were splitting and merging which caused a constant chaos. Former 
communist parties benefited from that unstable situation and finally cap‑
tured power. András Körösényi reports in 1994 and 1998 the electorate of 
MSzP consisted not only of people who were dissatisfied with bad condition, 
but also of upper class who derived from former nomenclature.20 Radosław 
Markowski reveals surveys made during elections which say that in 1990s 
the electorate of SLD represented following groups: in 1991 — 26.3% pen‑
sioners and 25.8% white -collars workers, in 1993 — 23.7% intelligentsia and 
26.0% white -collars workers, and in 1997 — 25.9% pensioners and 29.4% 
white ‑collars workers.21
Another common factor for SLD and MSzP was the participation in gov‑
ernment. The leftist parties initiated coalitional governments though MSzP 
did not have to, since it won the 1994 elections and received more than 50% 
of the mandates. The two coalitions consisted of post -communist party and 
an additional one. In Poland, it was Polish People’s Party (Pol. Polskie Stron‑
nictwo Ludowe, PSL), while in Hungary, the Alliance of Free Democrats — 
Hungarian Liberal Party (Hun. Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SzDSz). PSL 
was a satellite party in communism era before 1989. It was an agrarian and 
partly Christian -democratic organisation. SzDSz was one of the three main 
oppositional parties that emerged before 1989 in Hungary and its profile was 
liberal. It was dissolved at the end of 2013.
MSzP wanted to legitimize its position and governance that is why SzDSz 
was invited to take part in a coalition as a former anti -communism opposi‑
tion party. It was possible because SzDSz moved from clear liberal posi‑
tion towards social -liberal one. SzDSz remained liberal in economics but lost 
a bit impetus of preferring human rights values. During first years of the 
18 R. Markowsk i: The Polish SLD in the 1990s…, p. 63.
19 A. Körösény i: Governement and Politics in Hungary…, p. 48.
20 Ibidem, p. 49.
21 R. Markowsk i: The Polish SLD in the 1990s…, p. 60.
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MSzP-SzDSz coalition there was a lot of tension and breakup possibilities. 
But then the cooperation improved. Prime minister was the MSzP leader 
Gyula Horn. The governmental partners agreed on several points: European 
and NATO integration, developing good relations with neighbours, continu‑
ing economic reforms. That time Hungarian economy was crippling and the 
MSzP -SzDSz coalition partners knew they had to rescue it because otherwise 
the country would have gone bankrupt. Economy was the most important 
problem. The then Hungarian minister of finance László Békesi proposed 
a very liberal plan that was disapproved not only by his socialist colleagues, 
but also by the prime minister. Just after seven months from the govern‑
ment appointment Békesi was forced to dismiss. SzDSz was shocked because 
although Békesi was a socialist, his attitude was liberal. His position was 
taken by Lajos Bokros. But he prepared another liberal plan of economic 
reforms which was as much radical as Békesi’s. The “Bokros package” con‑
tained restrictive fiscal policy measures, gradual devaluation of the forint, 
introduction of tuition fees, increase of prices and reduction of real wages, 
as well as acceleration of privatization. However, some radical points were 
withdrawn later. After a year Bokros was dismissed and replaced by Péter 
Medgyessy.22
The situation with economic reforms showed an attempt to change the 
post -communist party. The top leaders knew that only liberal reforms could 
heal economics, but majority of lower rank members still believed in neces‑
sity of socialist and gradual reforms. The concept of liberalization won 
although it was stopped several times. 
Polish harsh economic reforms were introduced earlier than in Hunga‑
ry by the minister of finance Leszek Balcerowicz who served in cabinets 
of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. After 1993, SLD and 
PSL decided to continue the reforms. SLD ministers of finance were Marek 
Belka and Grzegorz Kołodko. The gains were quite good: annual inflation 
went down from about 34.0% in 1993 to 14.0% in 1997, a budget deficit was 
kept below 3.0%, public debt dropped below 50.0% and unemployment rate 
decreased from 15.0% in 1993 to 12.0% in 1997. Yet, some steps like restruc‑
turing rural areas or privatizing giant industrial unprofitable enterprises were 
halted. SLD -PSL coalition created ineffective holdings and paternalized 
administration. Similar to the Hungarian case, Polish post -communist party 
was more liberal, especially in economic terms, than socialist. SLD elites 
could introduce macroeconomic liberal reforms because the society was 
involved in axiological dispute over abortion, role of the Church, religion at 
school. It distracted Poles’ attention from liberal economic modernization.23 
22 B. Góra lcz yk: Węgierski pakiet. Warszawa 2000, pp. 154—160.
23 R. Markowsk i: The Polish SLD in the 1990s…, p. 60.
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In both cases after four years of governance SLD and MSzP lost elec‑
tions and became opposition. MSzP criticized the first Fidesz government 
(1998—2002) for conservative and traditional policy which divided Hungar‑
ians. MSzP paid attention to extremely high funds sent to rural districts and 
emphasized that too much money was given to Hungarian companies which 
halted foreign capital flow. MSzP thought that the law act on Hungarian 
ethnic minorities living abroad would give them too much rights, but gener‑
ally agreed on the necessity of introduction of such law.24 
After losing elections in 1997, SLD had to make efforts and fight in order 
not to go down and be marginalized on political arena. New central -rightist 
cabinet offered four packaged reforms of: local government, health care 
system, education and pension system. But to introduce those reforms the 
AWS–UW coalition needed opposition support. Therefore, SLD negotiated 
some aspects of new arrangements. Social reception of AWS–UW reforms 
was unseccessful which partly strengthened SLD. Another problem that 
SLD had to face during opposition time was vetting process (verifying the 
past of politicians in terms of their possible co -operation with communist 
secret services). AWS–UW cabinet returned to its campaign promises in this 
respect, and that is why all forces in SLD started to combat that idea.25 
After the 2002 elections MSzP created a government with SzDSz, even 
though it was Fidesz that won. But there were only three parties in the 
National Assembly: MSzP, Fidesz and SzDSz and Fidesz was unable to make 
a coalition with SzDSz. Péter Medgyessy became a prime minister. In 2004, 
it was revealed that Medgyessy worked for secret service in communism and 
he was forced to resign.26 He was replaced by Ferenc Gyurcsány. New social-
liberal government implemented changes in the law act which guaranteed 
rights for Hungarians living in neighbouring states and decided to cooperate 
with the USA in the war in Iraq. In 2004, Hungary became EU member, but 
first elections to European Parliament were won by oppositional Fidesz.27 
In 2006, MSzP won consecutive parliamentary elections and regained 
power with SzDSz as a coalitional partner. But only few months later prime 
minister Ferenc Gyurcsány provoked the greatest mass protests in post- 
24 L. Benda: “System partyjny Węgier”. In: Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej. 
Red. A. A ntoszewsk i, P. Fia la, R. Herbut,  J. Sroka. Wrocław 2003, pp. 99—100.
25 A. Mate r ska  -Sosnowska: Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej — do‑
stosowanie syndykatu władzy do zasad demokracji parlamentarnej. Warszawa 2006, 
pp. 188—194.
26 J. Da r sk i: “Węgry.” Europa Środkowo ‑Wschodnia 2001/2002, nos. XI—XII, p. 264 
[http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=57be2817 -bef4 -4cff -8516 -40e7b9cefa
d5&articleId=9d983ef6 -3f28 -41ce -9057 -47eea9de9d9b, (accessed 8.4.2014)].
27 A. Cz yż,  S. Kubas: Doświadczenia węgierskiej transformacji ustrojowej…, 
pp. 85—87.
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communist Hungary. From a closed -door meeting of MSzP leaders it was 
revealed that he had been lying for about last two years about Hungarian 
economic measures. They were devastating, but Gyurcsány was assuring 
they were quite good. Even though prime minister’s words were openly pub‑
lished by mass media and he admitted they were his, he did not decide 
to resign until 2009. In 2008 social -liberal government introduced a reform 
package which was to alleviate bad situation in state financial sphere. When 
Ferenc Gyurcsány dismissed minister of health, member of SzDSz, the 
party suddenly withdrew its support for the government and left it. It finally 
made Gyurcsány to resign. He was replaced by Gordon Bajnai who formed 
a minority government with MSzP and independent ministers. This step was 
to help MSzP to hold social support, but it did not prevent from slow decline 
in public opinion polls, and finally led to socialist failure in the 2010 elec‑
tions.28 
Polish parliamentary elections in 2001 were won by the SLD–UP coali‑
tion. On the one hand, electoral coalition SLD–UP resulted from similar party 
programmes and UP was afraid of being totally marginalized. On the other 
hand, SLD wanted to make a coalition with a party whose background would 
not have been communist at all.29 After 2001, SLD promoted Polish integra‑
tion with the EU, which has been reflected in the party programme from 
1999 on. SLD thought that Polish participation in NATO should be devel‑
oped. Another vivid problem which was present after 2001 was women’s par‑
ticipation in party and party elites.30 Leszek Miller’s cabinet was best known 
for finalizing Polish accession to EU and scandals involving SLD members’ 
participations. As a result of scandals support for the party dropped to 10% 
and tended not to rise. The best known scandal was the Rywin affair (also 
half -jokingly called “Rywingate”). Lew Rywin wanted to take control of 
media market in Poland and probably acted on behalf of SLD elite members. 
When Adam Michnik revealed the problem of money fraud, SLD started to 
loose support. It was rumoured that Leszek Miller was one of the elite mem‑
bers participating in the fraud affair. Just after EU accession Leszek Miller 
resigned from leading the cabinet and was replaced by Marek Belka. The 
latter’s cabinet was left by previous coalitional partner PSL, but remained on 
the basis of SLD–UP. As time went on, Marek Belka’s government released 
from SLD surveillance. On 6 March 2004, Leszek Miller resigned from party 
leadership being followed by Krzysztof Janik, and then by Józef Oleksy. But 
28 Ibidem, pp. 88—91.
29 W. Wojt a si k: “Stamtąd do wieczności. Ewolucja programowa SLD. 1991—2006.” 
In: Polska lewica u progu XXI wieku. Ed. Ł. Tomcz yk. Wrocław 2008, p. 57.
30 Ł. Tomcz yk: “Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej — od koalicji do partii, od rządu do 
opozycji.” In: Partie i ugrupowania parlamentarne III Rzeczypospolitej. Eds. K. Kowal‑
cz yk, J. Siel sk i. Toruń 2006, pp. 77—86.
95Sebastian Kubas: Similarities and differences of main left-wing…
both leaders did not symbolize generational changes that were needed then. 
In March 2004, Marek Borowski announced the creation of a new centre-
left party, the Social Democracy of Poland (Pol. Socjaldemokracja Polska, 
SDPL). 
After 2010 the position of MSzP changed dramatically compared to the 
role played by this party since 1994. The number of socialist members in the 
Hungarian parliament dropped from 186 to 59. The breakdown of the MSzP 
resulted in new divisions within the party. Katalin Szili who had served as 
a Speaker of the National Assembly from 2002 to 2009 decided to form 
a Movement of Alliance for the Future in 2010. Then, she run for a parlia‑
mentary mandate, which she finally received. Afterwards she formed a new 
party Socialist Union (Hun. Szociális Unió, SU). It is worth mentioning that 
Katalin Szili was a socialist candidate for the post of president in 2005. The 
profile of the party was social -democratic. Another important MSzP politi‑
cian who left the party was Ferenc Gyurcsány. In October 2011 he announced 
his decision on leaving the party. Then, he created Democratic Coalition 
(Hun. Demokratikus Koalíció, DK). Initially, Gyurcsány’s idea was to push 
a new party towards liberal and conservative ideas, but finally it was decided 
to stand in the centre -left position. Ferenc Gyurcsány wanted DK to represent 
those who in 1989 were social -democrats without communist legacies. 
In October 2012 a former socialist prime minister Gordon Bajnai formed 
a leftist party Together 2014 (Hun. Együtt 2014). One of the decisive rea‑
sons to form the party was the unconditional disagreement with Viktor 
Orbán’s policy. Later on the party was joined by Dialogue for Hungary (Hun. 
Párbeszéd Magyarországért, PM) which split from Politics Can Be Different 
(Hun. Lehet Más a Politika, LMP) giving the new coalition a social -liberal 
profile.
Due to the fact that after 2010 Fidesz appropriated public area for its own 
ideas and did not want to share the state decisions with anyone else, some 
left -wing and liberal organisations decided to join forces. In September 2013, 
MSzP signed an electoral agreement with DK and Hungarian Liberal Party 
(Hun. Magyar Liberális Párt, Liberals). This coalition was accompanied by 
Together 2014 and Dialogue for Hungary. In January 2014 the coalition sub‑
mitted a joint list for the parliamentary elections. The coalition head was 
MSzP leader Attila Mesterházy and it received 26.0% of total votes. 
SLD lost parliamentary elections in 2005 and has never repeated its 
successes from 1993 nor 2001. Jerzy Hausner left SLD and joined a new 
social-liberal Democratic Party (Pol. Partia Demokratyczna, PD). In 2004, 
SLD appointed a new chairman Krzysztof Janik, and after him this post was 
taken by Józef Oleksy. But both of them represented members of the old 
guard. These nominations did not present needed image change, so in 2005 
the party board decided to put the leadership in the hands of young Wojciech 
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Olejniczak. He convinced the fragmented left camp to build a coalition Left 
and Democrats which entered 2007 elections, but split afterwards. In 2008, 
Wojciech Olejniczak was replaced by another young social -democrat Grze‑
gorz Napieralski. But polls still revealed weak position of SLD. Leszek Miller 
regained leadership in 2011 and he is currently the SLD chairman. In 2005, 
SLD received 11.35% of total votes, in 2007 — 13.15% and in 2011 only 
5.87%. As Katarzyna Sobolewska -Myślik claims, the main problem for SLD 
after 2005 is decomposition and the combat to retain social support.31
A quantitative analysis of MSzP and SLD. Chosen aspects 
The role and position of a party in any party system can be described 
by different measures. Quantitative analysis shows the extent of a party 
and its possible influence on public life which is derived from social sup‑
port. Because party system creates a dynamic structure it changes differ‑
ent aspects of its functioning. The quantitative measurements describe real 
strength of a party. Moreover, they can be used as comparative tools to show 
how the party changes in a given aspect and to compare different parties. 
Altogether these measurements serve to build a complex and coherent vision 
of a party system. 
There are numerous indicators which reveal the strength of a party, such 
as number of parties, number of relevant parties, fractionalization index and 
aggregation index. Other indicators focus on ideological distance within 
political scene: right -left score, polarization index, the size of anti -system 
parties as a measure of ideological distance. Dynamic function of a party 
system can be measured by indices of volatility and party change. There are 
indices that measure occurrence of social cleavages in a party system.32 Real 
party influence on public life can be described by using an index of govern‑
ment relevancy of a party which consists of a party participation in govern‑
ments and governmental responsibility of a party.33 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to discuss all of those measurements in 
order to present position of MSzP and SLD within political systems in a short 
analysis. That is why I decided to choose only few of them which, in my 
31 K. Sobolewska  -Myśl i k: “Przekształcenia systemu partyjnego RP.” Athenaeum — 
Polskie Studia Politologiczne 2009, No. 22, p. 160.
32 S. Er sson, J. -K. Lane: “Democratic Party Systems in Europe. Dimensions, Change 
and Stability.” Scandinavian Political Studies 1982, Vol. 5 (2), pp. 71—73.
33 R. Herbut: “Systemy partyjne.” In: Demokracje zachodnioeuropejskie. Analiza 
porównawcza. Eds. A. A ntoszewsk i, R. Herbut. Wrocław 1997, pp. 180—181.
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opinion, can offer us a quite general image of leftist parties in Poland and 
Hungary. First two refer to governmental relevancy and show approximate 
position of a party not only in a party system, but also in state public politics. 
Unfortunately, this index has a disadvantage, which I will mention later.34 
That is why it is necessary to supplement it with an analysis of the strength 
of left -wing parties measured by the extent of electorate support given in 
parliamentary elections. 
Let us start with a measurement of government relevancy of a party con‑
nected with the index of party participation in governments. As Ryszard 
Herbut states, this index is derived from Giuseppe Iearci’s theory. The index 
presents a real impact of a party on governmental politics by dividing how 
many times a party participated in a government by all created governments: 
Ip = P/G (Ip — index of party participation in governments; P — number 
of cabinets with a given party participation; G — number of all cabinets). 
The value of this index is within the interval from 0 to 1. When it equals 0, 
it means that a party did not participate in any government, whereas when it 
equals 1, a party participated in all governments.35 
In the Polish case I decided to take into account the cabinets beginning 
from the first free elections in 1991. There were 12 cabinets with the fol‑
lowing prime ministers: Jan Olszewski, Hanna Suchocka, Waldemar Pawlak, 
Józef Oleksy, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Jerzy Buzek, Leszek Miller, Marek 
Belka, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Jarosław Kaczyński, and Donald Tusk (2). 
SdRP/SLD participated in six cabinets (Józef Oleksy, Włodzimierz Cimosze‑
wicz, Waldemar Pawlak, Leszek Miller and Marek Belka). It should be noted 
that Marek Belka’s cabinet freed from the surveillance of SLD after some 
time. But more important is the fact that this index does not fully present the 
strength of a party relevance because it can show better results for a party 
which participated in more coalitional cabinets in shorter period than for 
a party which created a long -term, yet only one cabinet. The index for PO is 
0.16, but it has been a governmental party for seven years (SLD for 8 years). 
The index for SLD is 0.42.
It is worth comparing the position of SLD to other parties. Let us present 
the data referring to chosen parties that participated in more than one cabi‑
nets: UW/UD — 0.25; Solidarność/AWS — 0.33; PSL — 0.42; ZChN — 
0.25; PC/PiS — 0.33; PO — 0.16. So, from 25 years of political transforma‑
tion, SLD is the party with one of the best results, second only to PSL. On 
34 An interesting view of the governmental relevance index, yet presented in a bit differ‑
ent way is given by: K. Patkowsk i: “Pozycja i znaczenie partii wywodzących się z systemu 
niedemokratycznego na scenie partyjnej w Polsce, Czechach, Słowacji i na Węgrzech po 
1989 r.” Środkowoeuropejskie studia polityczne 2001, No. 1, pp. 113—131.
35 Ibidem, p. 180.
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the other hand, SLD played initiating role in creation of the cabinet, while 
PSL was only a pivotal party. 
In Hungary there have been 10 cabinets: József Antall, Péter Boross, 
Gyula Horn, Viktor Orbán (1), Péter Medgyessy, Ferenc Gyurcsány (1, 
2), Gordon Bajnai, Viktor Orbán (2, 3). The indices for the parties are: MSzP 
— 0.5, Fidesz — 0.3, SzDSz — 0.4, KDNP — 0.3, FKgP — 0.3, MDF — 
0.3. But here, again, it has to be said that although the difference between 
indices for MSzP and Fidesz is 0.2, the length of cabinets with the two par‑
ties participation is similar. MSzP ruled for 12 years and Fidesz has already 
been governing the country for eight years and won April 2014 elections with 
perspective for next four years. MSzP and SLD have quite high indices of 
party participation in governments which result from the electorate support 
given in parliamentary elections. 
Now, let us take a look at the index of governmental responsibility of 
parties. This index refers to number of prime ministers and shows how many 
chiefs of cabinets belonged to a given party in relation to the total number 
of cabinets. This index reflects better the real influence of a party because it 
reveals the direct responsibility of a party in a cabinet. Not always the leader 
of a winning party becomes a prime minister, sometimes a smaller party 
appoints his leader to govern a country. The index is calculated in following 
way: Ir = Np/G (Ir — index of governmental responsibility of a party, Np 
— number of cabinets with a prime minister from a given party, G — total 
number of cabinets). The value of the index is within the interval from 0 to 
1. When it equals 0, it means that a party did not have any prime minister, 
whereas when it equals 1 a party appointed all prime ministers.36 The index 
for SLD is 0.4, while for MSzP is 0.5. To compare the results of the SLD and 
MSzP to other parties it appears that they are quite high. In Poland the results 
of other parties are: PO — 0.17, PC/PiS — 0.25, UW/UD — 0.083, PSL 
— 0.083, Solidarność/AWS — 0.083. In Hungary the results of other par‑
ties are: MDF — 0.2, Fidesz — 0.3. Although Péter Medgyessy and Gordon 
Bajnai were formally independent they were appointed by MSzP and served 
as socialist prime ministers. 
The accumulated index of government relevancy of a party can be achieved 
by summarizing and dividing two indices: the index of party participation in 
governments and the index of governmental responsibility of a party. For 
both left -wing parties equals respectively: SLD — 0.41 and MSzP — 0.5. 
Results for other Polish parties are: PSL — 0.25, Solidarność/AWS — 0.18, 
UD/UW — 0.16, PC/PiS — 0.29, PO — 0.17. Results for other Hungarian 
parties are: MDF — 0.25 and Fidesz — 0.3. 
36 Ibidem, p. 180.
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Table 1.
Voters’ support for SLD and MSzP in consecutive parliamentary elections: 1990—2014 (%)
Party
Poland:  
1991/
Hungary:  
1990
Poland:  
1993/
Hungary:  
1994
Poland:  
1997/
Hungary:  
1998
Poland:  
2001/
Hungary:  
2002
Poland:  
2005/
Hungary:  
2006
Poland:  
2007/
Hungary:  
2010
Poland:  
2011/
Hungary:  
2014
SLD 11.99 27.69 27.13 41.04 11.31 13.15 8.24
MSzP 10.90 31.30 29.80 40.05 43.21 19.30* 26.00**
 * LiD (coalition SLD, SDPL, PD and UP).
** Coalition of MSzP, Együtt 2014, DK, PM and MLP.
During the 25 years of transformation Polish and Hungarian successors of 
communist parties gradually strengthened their position on political arenas. 
They started from the level of about 10% of voters’ support (SLD — 11.99% 
in 1991, and MSzP — 10.90% in 1990) then rose to more than 40% (SLD — 
41.04% in 2001 and MSzP — 43.21% in 2005), but in the last decade they lost 
their high position almost simultaneously and the electoral support dropped 
to 8.24% in case of SLD (2011) and MSzP 19.30% (2010). Hungarian Left 
tried to consolidate and formed a broad coalition which received 26.0% of 
total votes in 2014, but was unable to seize power from Fidesz. 
Conclusions
The role and position of SLD and MSzP changed over the 25 years of 
political transformation. In the introduction of the article, I put forward 
three research questions: 1) How did the dominant social -democratic parties 
emerge and enter contemporary party system? 2) What made them successful 
during parliamentary elections? 3) Why have they been recently less popular 
and is this a constant trend? To answer the first one, both parties transformed 
themselves from former communist hegemons and inherited their organisa‑
tions. After 1989 it was a big advantage while other emerging parties could 
not count on such structures. Only post -communist parties (SLD, MSzP) 
and former satellites (ZSL, SD) could be called typical parties in the time 
of breakthrough because others could not build institutional forms in such 
a short period of time. Yet, the post -communists lost first parliamentary elec‑
tions and then were isolated by other parties which blamed them for their 
communist ancestors’ background (PZPR and MSzMP). Then they succeed‑
ed in the second elections (1993 in Poland, 1994 in Hungary). Afterwards 
they lost, but then regained power (2001 in Poland, and 2002 in Hungary) and 
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lost again. SLD and MSzP became modern contemporary social -democratic 
parties and impacted patterns of democratization.
Now let us answer the second hypothesis from the introduction. Par‑
liamentary victories of the Left had many causes. Firstly, there were still 
many believers in socialism who opted for these political ideas. Secondly, 
early years of freedom brought disillusionment and apathy. People felt they 
were cheated by former oppositionists who quarrelled and split. The elector‑
ate changed their opinions and supported the left. Thirdly, post -communist 
parties were able to use their experience and unity to present themselves 
as organisations which could help people in those harsh times. Fourthly, in 
the beginning the right camp was divided in Poland and in Hungary. Some 
attempts of its unification were made, yet just after a decade of political 
transformation Fidesz and PiS were able to organise more solid right -wing 
parties which could compete with the left. While the right camp was divided, 
the Left benefited. 
The third hypothesis is connected with the worsening position of Polish 
and Hungarian left -wing parties after 2005 and 2010 elections? The natural 
reason of immediate failure in the parliamentary elections was economic 
downturn and disclosure of scandals and corruption affairs. It was obvi‑
ous that leftist parties took a major role in shaping party systems in both 
countries over the first decade of transformation. Afterwards, they deep‑
ened in politics that did not take into account huge social dissatisfaction 
caused by effects of wrong decisions and actions. After losing the elections 
the electorate that supported left -wing parties shifted to other parties and 
only loyal voters gave their support in following elections. When the par‑
ties wanted to strengthen themselves they suddenly faced new challenges. 
Splits of existing parties and newly created parties received votes of former 
leftist. Worsening of the left -wing parties position made centre -right parties 
dominate. What remains is the following question: Will the leftist parties 
regain power?
The thesis of the article was that despite social, historical and other dif‑
ferences of Polish and Hungarian left -wing parties there are some similarities 
as well. The analysis made in the article verified the thesis positively. Apart 
from the facts explained and developed in the first two sections of the article 
and summarised above as answers to the hypothesis, the similarities can be 
described by reference to quantitative indicators. They were presented in the 
last section of the article.
Electoral support for main leftist parties in Poland and Hungary shows 
some similarities referring to the whole period of transformation. In the 
beginning it was average (SLD — 11.99% in 1991, and MSzP — 10.90% in 
1990) then rose to more than 40.00% (SLD — 41.04% in 2001, and MSzP 
— 43.21% in 2005), but then in the last decade it dropped (SLD — 8.24% 
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in 2011, and MSzP — 19.30% in 2010, and the leftist coalition with MSzP — 
26% in 2014). 
The index of party participation in governments which aims at revealing 
the influence of a party on state politics for SLD equals 0.42 and for MSzP 
0.5. It is quite high. The index of governmental responsibility of a party 
refers to the posts of prime ministers taken by party members. It is for SLD 
0.4 and MSzP 0.5 and is higher than for any other parties in both countries. 
The accumulated index of government relevancy which is achieved by sum‑
marizing and dividing the two above indices is for SLD 0.41 and MSzP 0.50. 
It means than both leftist parties influenced public politics throughout the 
period of political transformation. 
